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Kevin J. Fandl*
ABSTRACT
At the firm level, bribery and corruption can substantially distort
international trade by giving unfair advantages to potentially less-
competitive firms, allowing bribe recipients to rely on personal enrichment
rather than quality to assess the market. At the state level, bribery
and corruption can similarly distort the market by skewing the delivery of
goods and services to the government in favor of corrupt firms. Anti-
bribery laws exist at the state and multilateral level in many instances, but
these laws have limited reach and suffer weak enforcement in many
countries. Some laws, such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, have
been applied extraterritorially through evidence of a U.S. nexus. But many
firms avoid scrutiny by focusing on domestic transactions, including those
with their own government institutions.
Two mechanisms have arisen recently to enhance the push for broad
acceptance and enforcement of anti-bribery laws. These include trade
agreements and multilateral loan agreements. Many trade agreements such
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership include strict anti-bribery provisions
applicable to member nations. These often promote fairness in sourcing
and procurement and, accordingly, trade and investment. Likewise, loan
agreements from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank include
rigid anti-corruption policies and investigative and enforcement offices that
can debar contractors across a number of multilateral institutions, risking
millions in loans to countries in need. Both of these mechanisms apply
incentives and disincentives to encourage compliance with principles of
fairness and transparency in doing business.
Much has been written about anti-corruption provisions in trade
agreements already.1 In this paper, I will address the application of anti-
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bribery and anti-corruption provisions in the context of multilateral loan
agreements entered into by multilateral development banks (MDBs),
specifically focused on those facilitated by the Inter-American
Development Bank for Latin American countries. I will explain the
applicable policies and enforcement of those provisions and provide an
analysis of their effect on levels of trade and corruption in recipient
countries.
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INTRODUCTION
The impact of corruption is disproportionate to the level and
frequency at which it occurs and [it] often has serious ramifications in
terms of public confidence across public and private sectors.2
If a bank were to provide you with a loan of $1 million to fund a start-
Global Immersions. He previously served as Senior Counsel to the Assistant Secretary for
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and worked extensively on trade and
immigration-related matters throughout his decade of federal service. The author is grateful
for the valuable insights offered by Inter-American Development Bank Senior Attorney
Monica Lugo and former Inter-American Development Bank Knowledge Management
Attorney Bernadita Saez, as well as to the excellent editorial staff of the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for their outstanding editorial work.
1. See, e.g., Amy Novak Fuentes, How Free Trade Agreements Can Improve Anti-
corruption Enforcement: A Case Study of the United States and Colombia, 45 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 479 (2016) (suggesting that the United States could cut off the demand for bribes by
invoking Free Trade Agreement (FTA) provisions to enforce anti-corruption obligations
with its trading partners); ALINA MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, ANTI-CORRUPTION PROVISIONS IN EU
FREE TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: DELIVERING ON CLEAN TRADE 5 (2018)
(claiming that “international trade agreements have the potential to act as the exogenous
factor breaking the vicious circle of corruption in economies based on privileged
connections rather than fair competition”).
2. NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY, NATIONAL STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF SERIOUS AND
ORGANISED CRIME 13 (2004).
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up venture that you proposed, and you spent 75% of that money on the
business and the other 25% on a much-needed vacation, so long as you
paid back 100% of the loan, the bank’s objectives would be met. The fact
that you only required $750,000 for your business is of no consequence so
long as the bank is repaid. However, the additional debt resulting from
your vacation splurge creates a strain on you and others (such as your
spouse or business partners) that must repay the debt.
In many ways, this has been the attitude of multilateral lending
institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), in the provision of development aid to countries in need.
They loan money to countries with certain deliverables in mind, such as the
construction of a dam, improvement of public schools, or development of
more transparent governance programs. Whether the loan is in fact utilized
completely for the project may be less important to the lender than
completion of the stipulated goals.3 Completion of the project becomes the
basis for the loan, and the loan recipient is left to determine how best to
utilize those funds while still completing the contract. However, unlike in
the case of a personal loan, the burden to repay the entire debt falls upon
the recipient country’s taxpayers, who may not be benefitting completely
from the investment.
This approach has allowed corruption, already pernicious in Latin
America, to seep into these loan agreements and substantially weaken their
effect on economic development. The IDB and other multilateral
development banks (MDBs) have turned a corner in the last two decades by
bringing corruption into the sunlight and exposing it for what it is: a drain
on economic growth and development. MDBs today combat corruption by
including prohibited practice clauses that identify four types of corruption
that would lead to investigation and potential debarment from future
contracts for a period of time. As part of this effort, MDBs now cross-
debar firms to prevent corrupt entities from receiving contracts from
several institutions in that or other countries.4 Accordingly, companies
looking for work with a government that is being funded by an MDB
should be incentivized to follow the anti-corruption standards laid out in
these agreements.
3. See Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate
Corruption on World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
231, 235 (2011) (noting that the bank “look[s] more than anything else at what the project
achieves . . . We look, for instance, at whether schools get built, not how the money was
spent to build them.” (quoting Jeffrey A. Winters, Criminal Debt, in REINVENTING THE
WORLD BANK 101, 111 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002))).
4. CROSS DEBARMENT: AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL ENFORCEMENT OF DEBARMENT
DECISIONS AMONG MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, http://lnadbg4.adb.org/oai001p.n
sf/ [https://perma.cc/Q9J4-3XUR] (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
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MDBs provide approximately $100 billion in annual loans to facilitate
development projects, improve governance and promote democratic best
practices.5 Rampant corruption throughout the target recipients of this
development aid threaten to dramatically limit the impact of that aid.
Accordingly, these institutions have turned their attention to accountability
efforts that help them to reduce the likelihood that donor funds are
misappropriated for fraudulent or corrupt purposes. Mandating compliance
with these anti-corruption practices is now a standard aspect of the loan and
procurement process.6
In this paper, I consider the effectiveness of anti-corruption provisions
within multilateral loan agreements, with an emphasis on loans in Latin
America provided by the IDB. I begin with a brief overview of corruption
and efforts to combat it in the region, as well as an examination of its
effects on communities and economic development. I then discuss the loan
procurement process through the IDB with particular emphasis on anti-
corruption provisions. I go on to discuss examples of anti-corruption
actions in practice to highlight the ineffectiveness of efforts made by the
IDB to combat corruption. And finally, I close with suggestions for
working toward more effective anti-corruption efforts in the future.
I. CORRUPTION
“Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either
as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in
government work cannot be found out [while] taking money [for
themselves].”7
In his comprehensive history of corruption through the ages, Italian
scholar Carlo Alberto Brioschi explains that the act of gift-giving in
exchange for favors or positions was routine, accepted, and often
encouraged.8 According to Brioschi, from ancient Mesopotamia through
biblical times, it was expected that a suitable gift be given to politicians and
church leaders to gain favor or even to be given an audience. There was no
association between what we would consider to be bribery and unethical
actions.
5. REBECCA M. NELSON, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 4 (2018), https://fas.or
g/sgp/crs/row/R41170.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAC5-ZGKW].
6. Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on
World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 231, 235
(2011).
7. KAUṬALYA, CHANAKYA’S ARTHAŚÁSTRA, OR, SCIENCE OF POLITICS 80 (R.
Shamasastry B. A. trans., 1908).
8. CARLO ALBERTO BRIOSCHI, CORRUPTION: A SHORT HISTORY (2017).
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Bribery can be defined as “a corrupt benefit given or received to
influence official action so as to afford the giver better than fair
treatment.”9 Looking back on historical precedents reminds us how routine
bribery, fraud, and collusion were to the conduct of business and politics.
Very few examples of efforts to combat these practices or even to draw
attention to their negative impact on the broader economy can be found
prior to the modern era. Corruption ensured that those with power
maintained that power, and those without would remain oppressed.
The United States Constitution may be one of the oldest documents
establishing provisions to fight corruption. Article I section 9 of that
document prohibits the acceptance of gifts or favors by U.S. government
officials from foreign governments or their representatives.10 Commonly
known as the emoluments clause, the language reads as follows: “no
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.”11
While no certain definition of emolument has been settled upon, this clause
has been the basis of at least two lawsuits against the Trump
Administration for profits received from President Trump’s private
property holdings.12
Little effort to combat corruption arose between the passage of the
U.S. Constitution, which did very little to prosecute corruption, and the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), the first major law to
outlaw bribery.13 The FCPA is the most widely enforced anti-corruption
legislation in the world, yielding substantial fines and high-profile, cross-
border prosecutions. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) are the agencies
responsible for the enforcement of this Act and have taken aggressive
measures to do so.14 The number of cases brought by the SEC and DOJ
since 2006 has dramatically increased, reflecting a growing trend toward
9. See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion
Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1699 (1993) (explaining the distinction between
bribery and extortion, finding the former to be paying for an undeserved benefit and the
latter to be extracting a payment for a benefit already earned).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
11. Id.
12. E.g., Katie Benner, Judge Denies Trump’s Request to Dismiss Emoluments Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2018.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
14. Spotlight on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.shtml [https://pe
rma.cc/5R8K-L4HJ].
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leveling the global business playing field through the use of disincentives.15
What prompted passage of the FCPA was a series of events that led to
public, and subsequently congressional concern over illicit payments to
foreign officials. Among these were a series of payments made by major
U.S. firms, such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Gulf Oil and
Mobil Oil, all of which appeared to be intended to influence foreign
elections.16 In addition, in 1974, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama united to form an export
cartel for bananas in an effort to raise the price of banana exports to the
United States. The cartel initially proposed an export tax of $1.00 for every
forty-pound crate of bananas exported to the U.S. After threats by major
banana companies to withdraw from these markets, some countries
dropped their tax. In Honduras, the tax was reduced to $0.50. After the
head of United Fruit Brands jumped to his death from their corporate
headquarters in New York, the SEC opened an investigation into United
Fruit’s activities in Honduras. The SEC discovered that the company had
paid $2.5 million in bribes to the Honduran Minister of Economy to reduce
the tax from $0.50 to $0.25 per crate. When this occurred, no law existed
to prevent bribery of foreign officials by U.S. companies. Accordingly,
there was no possibility to bring a bribery or corruption lawsuit.17
With no direct tools to punish the actions of the U.S. fruit companies,
the SEC chose to release information about their actions in Honduras to
shareholders of United Fruit given the effect that it might have on the value
of the stock. That revelation led to public outcry in Honduras, leading to a
revolution in Honduras that overthrew their military government.18 It
became apparent that a more targeted solution to foreign bribery needed to
be put into place.
The 1977 FCPA makes it unlawful for any issuer (entity traded on a
U.S. stock exchange) or any officer, director, employee or agent of that
entity, to offer a payment or promise to pay or gift anything of value to a
foreign official in an effort to influence that official to violate the law or
secure an improper advantage in order to obtain or retain business.19 An
15. See DOJ and SEC Enforcement Actions per Year, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.html [https://perma.cc/96
ZS-N5C5] (reporting a rise from 14 cases in 2005 to 56 in 2010).
16. SeeMike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
929, 932–35 (2012) (discussing the Watergate Scandal and the subsequent investigation that
led to a number of bribery accusations of U.S. firms).
17. Id.
18. See Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655,
665–67 (1984) (describing the conditions leading to the revelation of governmental
involvement in the Bananagate scandal).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012).
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exception was made in the Act for facilitation payments, which include
payments made to facilitate an already legal process.20 Passage of this Act
was a milestone in anti-corruption efforts, as it was the first major law that
attempted both to root-out bribery in corporate America and also to govern
foreign bribery by ensnaring any business that had an association with the
United States.21
Initially, the FCPA was used only in a handful of prosecutions,
resulting in minimal fines.22 But in the past decade, the FCPA has become
a viable threat against corrupt businesses and both prosecutions and fines
have soared. Significant FCPA prosecutions have included United
Technologies,23 Credit Suisse,24 Dun and Bradstreet,25 and Legg Mason,26
all of which settled their cases in 2018. Actions have not been limited to
U.S. firms. The SEC has prosecuted companies such as UK-based Glaxo-
Smith-Kline,27 Brazil-based Embraer,28 and the France-based Total,29
among many others. However, it is important to note that these are all
multinational companies trading on the U.S. stock exchange.
Since 2006, the FCPA has served as a model for successful
investigation and enforcement of domestic and multinational firms engaged
in corrupt acts. Between 2007 and 2009, the SEC doubled the number of
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2012).
21. Hurd Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb.
1979, at 32.
22. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The
Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 495 (2011)
(noting that only a handful of cases were brought between 1977 and 2006).
23. Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, United Techs. Charged with Violating
FCPA (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-188 [https://perma.cc/
Z6H7-E7DZ].
24. Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Credit Suisse with FCPA
Violations (July 5, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-128 [https://perma.
cc/G9UB-3U7T].
25. Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Dun & Bradstreet with
FCPA Violations (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/enforce/34-83088-s [https://perma.c
c/57GQ-GN7H].
26. Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Legg Mason Charged with Violating
the FCPA (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-168 [https://perma
.cc/E4X8-WSAX].
27. GlaxoSmithKline Pays $20 Million Penalty to Settle FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-
79005-s.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QJ7-XFPY].
28. Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Embraer Paying $205 Million to Settle
FCPA Charges (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-224.html [http
s://perma.cc/B5XE-545S].
29. Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Total S.A. for Illegal
Payments to Iranian Official (May 29, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-
2013-94htm [https://perma.cc/FR39-CBR4].
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cases brought in the first 30 years of the FCPA.30 As of 2018, the SEC and
DOJ have brought over 500 enforcement actions under the FCPA with
penalties for firms and individuals totaling over $18 billion.31 This number
includes the largest FCPA settlement in history, resulting in a $3.5 billion
fine paid by the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht in 2016.32
Beyond the FCPA, a number of domestic and multilateral conventions
intended to prevent bribery have come into existence.33 Perhaps the most
substantial of these conventions are the 2005 United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC),34 which was proposed only two years after
the FCPA took effect, and the 1999 Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-bribery Convention.35 Those
two international laws bind state parties and not private entities, as the
FCPA does. The OECD Convention is narrow in scope and applies only to
cases of bribery of public officials. It also only applies to OECD member
countries, which stand at thirty-six as of this publication.36 However, it is
stricter than the FCPA in that it forbids facilitation payments, which the
FCPA allows in many instances.37 UNCAC is much broader, as it applies
to public and private entities engaged in bribery, money laundering, and
30. John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an
Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 27 (2012).
31. See, e.g., Stephanie Ashe, Stanford Law School and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Expand Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse, SLS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://law.stan
ford.edu/press/stanford-law-school-and-sullivan-cromwell-llp-expand-foreign-corrupt-
practices-act-clearinghouse/ [https://perma.cc/2DEQ-8AFG] (“Since its enactment in 1977,
the FCPA has generated more than 500 enforcement actions by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), implicating transactions in
more than 100 countries. Defendants in these actions have paid global fines and penalties in
excess of $18 billion.”).
32. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Odebrecht & Braskem Plead Guilty & Agree
to Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Glob. Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery Case in
History (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-
guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve [https://perma.cc/69Y2-W7C
C].
33. E.g., U.K. Bribery Act 2010 (Eng.); Convention Against Corruption Involving
Public Officials, 1977 O.J. (C 195) 1.
34. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003, 2349
U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter UNCAC].
35. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force Feb. 15,
1999) [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
36. List of OECD Member Countries, OECD, http://www.o ecd.org/about/membersand
partners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm [https://perma.cc/67MM-LAAZ].
37. See Jon Jordan, The OECD’s Call for an End to “Corrosive” Facilitation Payments
and the International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 881, 881–82 (2011) (explaining the 2009 change
to the OECD Convention prohibiting facilitation payments).
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abuse of power. It also has a much broader scope, applying to 186
countries.38
These conventions and statutes govern corrupt practices within the
parameters set by their governing institutions, such as the UN for the
UNCAC, the Organization of American States (OAS) for the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) and the OECD for the
Anti-bribery Convention. Similarly, individual countries often enact
domestic legislation prohibiting corrupt practices that operate within their
domestic jurisdictional parameters in addition to signing on to these
multilateral conventions. For instance, Colombia adopted the platform of
the IACAC in 1997, laying the foundation for its domestic anti-bribery
regime.39 It went on to sign UNCAC in 2003.40 Colombia’s criminal code
prohibits bribery of public officials and of private entities.41 Colombia also
ratified the OECD Anti-corruption Convention after updating their
domestic legislation to align with the requirements of that Convention.42
However, the mere adoption of anti-bribery platforms does not
necessarily translate to a reduction in bribery and corruption. Countries
must take the initiative to dedicate resources to the enforcement of these
laws. Colombia, for instance, recently enacted the Transnational
Corruption Act (2016) to strengthen enforcement of existing anti-bribery
laws and has begun to investigate and prosecute criminal bribery, levying
fines of $1.8 million and $50,000 in two recent prosecutions.43 However,
the Colombian legislature subsequently failed to enact reforms that would
have provided more transparency to transactions by government officials—
including the publication of tax returns—because the legislators, which the
reforms targeted, did not constitute a quorum for a vote.44 Similarly, Brazil
recently faced the largest corruption and bribery scandal to confront Latin
38. Signature and Ratification Status, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corru
ption/ratification-status.html [https://perma.cc/KVS2-3CML] (last updated June 26, 2018).
39. L. 412, Noviembre 6, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
40. L. 970, Julio 13, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) (implementing the
provisions of the UNCAC).
41. L. 404, Septiembre 16, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); L. 405, Septiembre
30, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); L. 406, Octubre 24, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Colom.).
42. L. 1778, Febrero 2, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
43. Matteson Ellis, Colombia Ramps Up Enforcement of Transnational Bribery Law,
FCPAMÉRICAS BLOG (July 12, 2018), http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-corruption-compli
ance/colombia-ramps-enforcement-transnational-bribery-law/ [https://perma.cc/BVC9-A7F
N].
44. Julia Symmes Cobb, Colombian Anti-Corruption Referendum Fails to Meet
Quorum, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-r
eferendum/colombian-anti-corruption-referendum-fails-to-meet-quorum-idUSKCN1LB0GI
[https://perma.cc/7NNZ-D4XG].
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America in decades, tied to bribes made by the state-owned oil company
Petrobras. Brazil signed on to the UNCAC in 2005, long before the
Petrobras scandal broke out. Seeing that being a part of that convention
was not enough, Brazil enacted its own anti-corruption law in 2014 to align
it with the principles of the OECD.45 That law, known as the Clean
Companies Act, provided for civil and administrative penalties for bribes of
public officials. Shortly thereafter, the Brazilian congress attempted to
modify its criminal code to include more severe penalties for acts such as
those committed in the vast Car Wash scandal (this legislation is pending
as of the time of this publication).46
Thus far, many companies in Latin America have faced few
repercussions for engaging in corrupt practices. According to OECD Chief
of Staff Gabriela Ramos, more than half of OECD member states have
never prosecuted an anti-bribery case.47 With one of the strongest anti-
bribery regimes in the region, Colombia has prosecuted only two cases,
with an additional twelve under investigation as of late 2018.48 Another
star performer in the region, Chile, has only prosecuted one case as of
2018.49 And though new laws, regulations, and threats of heightened
enforcement have proliferated, the risk of prosecution for some companies
may still be outweighed by the potential benefit of unethical practices.
This is where organizations such as MDBs may play a significant role
in combating corrupt practices and encouraging the implementation of
effective compliance regimes within companies. Throughout Latin
America and across most emerging markets, firms often depend on
opportunities provided by the state, from construction to power generation
to education. These opportunities can be very lucrative and offer secure
income since, in many instances, the funding is being partially or wholly
provided by an MDB. And while a state may have few incentives or
resources to investigate and prosecute corrupt practices within those
recipient firms, MDBs are actively examining their practices and creating
45. Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
2.8.2013 (Braz.).
46. Sérgio Fernando Moro, Preventing Systemic Corruption in Brazil, 147 J. AM.
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 157, 165 (2018).
47. See, e.g., OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, ANNUAL REPORT ON ACTIVITIES
UNDERTAKEN IN 2012 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/AntiBriberyAnnRep20
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/69WD-EXAP] (describing the data on the enforcement of the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery).
48. Matteson Ellis, Colombia Ramps Up Enforcement of Transnational Bribery Law,
CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com
/colombia-ramps-up-enforcement-of-transnational-bribery-law/ [https://perma.cc/R6F8-WN
67].
49. OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION: CHILE PHASE 4 REPORT 11 (2018).
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significantly more risk for their contractors. The penalties for unethical
practices under an MDB contract strike at the livelihood of the business
enterprise itself.
The MDB process for reducing corruption is at a more transactional
level than that of conventions and statutes. Though it is government that
signs the loan agreement with the MDB, contractors that carry out the work
under the contract are bound by the terms of that loan agreement, including
the anti-bribery provisions contained therein. In the event that a contractor
is found to have violated those provisions, the consequence is not
prosecution by the MDB, but disbarment from that and future contracts. In
addition, MDB sanction investigations often result in findings that are
shared with national governments, potentially paving the way to domestic
prosecution under criminal laws.50 And despite the more than 700
disbarments issued by the World Bank alone, many contractors remain
unaware that their work is part of a larger MDB project subjecting them to
the anti-bribery provisions of that agreement.51
The World Bank began to examine corruption as an element that may
be preventing effective economic development strategies in their
investments in 1996, when then Bank President James Wolfensohn referred
to the “cancer of corruption.”52 The World Bank Sanctions Committee was
established in 1998 to investigate and report on allegations of corruption
among borrowing countries.53 That group was moved into the newly
formed Department of Institutional Integrity in 2001. Six years later, this
group was elevated to the Vice Presidency level within the World Bank.
Today, the two-tiered sanctions system within the World Bank consists of
an Office of Suspension and Debarment (OSD) that assesses evidence in
allegations of corrupt practices, and the World Bank Group Sanctions
Board, an independent body that reviews OSD recommendations de novo
when accused parties appeal the first-tier decision.54
With respect to Latin America, where the IDB focuses its efforts, the
IACAC is in place to try and combat the rampant regional perception of
50. Id. at 6 (referencing cases investigated in tandem by the World Bank and DOJ, for
instance).
51. Brian Whisler et al., The World Bank’s Enforcement Arm and Its Impact on
Multinational Companies, RISK &COMPLIANCEMAG., Jan.–Mar. 2018, at 3.
52. Vinay Bhargava, Curing the Cancer of Corruption, in GLOBAL ISSUES FOR GLOBAL
CITIZENS: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES 341, 341 (Vinay Bhargava
ed., 2006).
53. WORLD BANK GRP., SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT FY18 5 (2018),
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/227911538495181415/WBG-SanctionsSystemARFY18-
final-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/38HH-FVSN].
54. Id. at 5–6.
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corruption.55 The IACAC was enacted in 1996 by the OAS, a body
comprised of most countries within the Latin American region.56 The key
element of that Convention is Article VI, which requires member states to
criminalize acts of corruption, principally targeting bribery.57 Bribery for
purposes of the Convention is defined as corrupt practices by state officials
within the territory of the state.58 Most member states made modifications
to their laws to prohibit corruption and criminalize corrupt acts.59
However, scholars note the vast gap between legislation and enforcement
of legal provisions such as these.60
First, corruption negatively influences a country’s economic
productivity, the stability of its political institutions, and its
democratic integrity. Second, corruption on large-scale
infrastructure projects creates an environment of impunity that
may instill a public conception that corruption is acceptable. . . .
‘[a] policy of active tolerance [for bribery] will undermine the
prospects for long-term reform’ and ‘delegitimize government in
the eyes of its citizens.’ Finally, corrupt deals made to win
infrastructure development projects skew government spending
and development agendas; such deals encourage officials to seek
aid money for projects that promise profits in the form of bribes
and kick-backs, rather than for projects that are more beneficial
but less profitable for the officials.61
According to some estimates, corruption may be affecting up to 20%
of the funds being distributed by the MDBs, resulting in hundreds of
millions of dollars being siphoned-off with no economic development
value.62 Other reports suggest that corruption is so rampant in some target
55. See generally Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The Emergence of an
International Enforcement Regime on Transnational Corruption in the Americas, 30 L. &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 53 (1999) (providing a comprehensive examination of the IACAC).
56. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724.
57. Id. at art. VI.
58. Id.
59. See Giorleny D. Altamirano, The Impact of the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 487, 509–25 (2007) (describing state-level
efforts to criminalize bribery and corruption in Latin America).
60. See Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Retooling Law Enforcement to
Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure Reforms for
Indonesia and Other Nations, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 183, 186 (2008) (describing the
importance of effect enforcement mechanisms to implement anti-corruption legislation).
But see Altamirano, supra note 59, at 540 (suggesting that legislation can often make
citizens and officials more aware of corrupt practices even if they are not prosecuted).
61. Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on
World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 231, 236–37
(2011) (internal quotations omitted).
62. The World Bank and Corruption, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 21, 2006),
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donor recipient countries that, despite extensive lending, economic
development is receding rather growing.63 These are not minor
accusations, and they must be addressed in the context of MDB lending. In
the following section, I will examine the efforts of the World Bank and the
IDB in combating this “cancer.”
II. COUNTRY-LEVEL LENDING BYMULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS
The role of multilateral lending institutions in facilitating effective
economic development cannot be understated. The World Bank was
created in 1944 as the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), with the initial mission of working to rebuild the
economies of post-World War II Europe.64 The Bank’s first loan was to
France for reconstruction following devastation after the war. The World
Bank is funded through contributions made by wealthy member countries
such as the United States, Japan and Germany, as well as through returns
on market investments and interest when loans are repaid.65
The World Bank operates as a lender of last resort for countries. They
provide low-interest loans to middle-income countries to assist with
development projects such as building roads and schools or providing clean
drinking water. Those same loans are available to low-income countries
without interest and on more favorable terms.66 Loans are provided only
for part of the proposed project—the remainder of the funding is provided
by the country and other lending sources, ensuring that the country has
“skin in the game.”
As noted above, the original mission of the IBRD in 1944 was to
provide funding to rebuild countries after World War II. The mission of
the IBRD began to evolve following successful post-war reconstruction
efforts, as evidenced by the creation of the 1960 International Development
Association (IDA). The IDA focused on development loans for poor
countries and operated with the same staff and resources as the rest of the
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/world-bank-and-corruption [https://perma.cc/SBR5-H2Y
Q].
63. Leonard F. McCarthy, Fighting Economic Corruption Around the World:
Successes, Challenges, and Staying the Course, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 29, 2011),
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/fighting-economic-corruption-around-the-wo
rld-successes-challenges-and [https://perma.cc/PB49-XBME].
64. Who We Are: History, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history
[https://perma.cc/3QG8-MXBF] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
65. Getting to Know the World Bank, WORLD BANK (July 26, 2012), http://www.worldb
ank.org/en/news/feature/2012/07/26/getting_to_know_theworldbank [https://perma.cc/2MN
G-NN2J].
66. Id.
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World Bank. However, politics and hesitation among the Bank’s Board of
Governors67 to assist needier countries slowed down the implementation of
the new economic development agenda facilitated by the IDA.68
The World Bank was largely reformulated in the 1960s following the
appointment of former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara as its
President in 1968.69 He understood the importance of economic
development in creating political stability and thus refocused the Bank on
lending principally to low-income countries. McNamara shifted not only
the focus of the Bank’s lending activities, but also its operation. He
expanded the staff dramatically and emphasized hiring from developing
countries, significantly diversifying a staff that had previously only
included 5% of representatives from those countries.70 During his tenure
there, McNamara oversaw a shift in focus from economic development
projects in Europe to economic development in low and middle-income
countries around the world. During McNamara’s 1968 inaugural speech,
he solidified a new role for the Bank—not as a state-focused lending
institution,71 but as a global economic development agency.72 This was the
beginning of the Bank as an active participant in economic development
efforts.73
Finally, in the late 1990s, the World Bank again shifted its focus—this
time, away from development loans for infrastructure projects and toward
loans to build institutions in developing countries that would help them
create sustainable, successful futures. This began with a 1999 speech by
then Bank President Wolfensohn, highlighting the need to focus on
effective and accountable institutions and capacity-building. “Providing
good policy advice is not enough; the Bank needs to focus even more than
it has in the past on helping governments develop the processes and
incentives to design and implement good policies themselves.”74 As part of
67. Consisting of member country Economy or Development Ministers.
68. Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the
Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159, 163–64 (1993).
69. William Clark, Reconsiderations: Robert McNamara at the World Bank, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept. 1, 1981, at 167–68.
70. Id. at 169.
71. Note that through the creation of the International Finance Corporation as part of
the IBRD in 1956, the Bank also lends to private companies and financial institutions in
developing countries. Who We Are: History, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/a
bout/history [https://perma.cc/BC9A-MPD2] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
72. Clark, supra note 69, at 170.
73. For a comprehensive summary of the World Bank’s initial foray into development
aid, see Sophie Smyth,World Bank Grants in a Changed World Order: How Do We Referee
This New Paradigm?, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2008).
74. PUBLIC SECTOR GROUP, WORLD BANK, REFORMING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND
STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE xii (2000).
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this new emphasis, the Bank would focus on anti-corruption as part of its
economic development efforts.75
In addition to efforts by the World Bank, four regional development
banks exist to provide targeted funding for economic development and
institution-building in their regions. These institutions are partners of the
World Bank and are largely based upon the same precepts and structures,
but they act independently of the World Bank strictures.76 These banks
include: the African Development Bank, established in 1964; the Asian
Development Bank, established in 1966; the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, established in 1991 and targeting post-
Soviet countries; and the Inter-American Development Bank, established in
1959.77
The Inter-American Development Bank, the focus of this analysis,
was established with the mission of facilitating economic development in
the Latin American region.78 It was created by the Organization of
American States with the following mission statement: “The purpose of
the Bank shall be to contribute to the acceleration of the process of
economic and social development of the regional developing member
countries, individually and collectively.”79 It consists of twenty-six
borrowing member countries that, unlike other regional development
banks, control 50% of the voting power within the institution.80 An
additional twenty-two countries are non-borrowing members, meaning that
they fund the bank and play a role in its governance.81 The United States is
the most significant of these latter countries, controlling 10% of the voting
75. Id. at 87–88.
76. See Andrew Hansen, The World Bank and International Development Lenders,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 1, 2007), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/world-bank-
and-international-development-lenders [https://perma.cc/PX75-PXPK] (providing a
summary of each of the four regional development banks).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco et al., Governance and Accountability: The Regional
Development Banks, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 32–46 (2009) (explaining the structure of the
IDB).
79. Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank art. I, § 1, Apr. 8,
1959, 389 U.N.T.S. 69, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=781584
[https://perma.cc/GPQ9-3ZHJ].
80. Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, and Venezuela.
81. United States, Canada, Japan, Israel, the Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic
of China, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.
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power in the institution.82
Today, the IDB consists of two bodies—the Inter-American
Investment Corporation (IIC), which provides support for small and
medium-sized enterprises in the region, and the Multilateral Investment
Fund, which focuses on private sector growth with an emphasis on
microenterprises.83 The strategy of the IDB is divided into two parts:
development challenges and cross-cutting challenges. The development
challenges focus on social inclusion and equality, productivity and
innovation, and economic integration. The cross-cutting challenges
address gender equality and diversity, climate change and environmental
sustainability, and institutional capacity and the rule of law.84 The last two
challenges envelop the issue of corruption in governance.
Below, I will explain the process for applying for and funding
development project loan assistance through the IDB.
a. The IDB Lending Process
The IDB provides funding to support member country development
projects with financing in the form of loans and investment guarantees.
This financing emphasizes three principal goals: 1) investment lending to
support goods and services that promote social and economic development;
2) policy-based lending to support institutional and policy reforms; and, 3)
special development lending that assists countries in a crisis situation.85
Loans from the IDB are, in most cases, combined with government
financing, as well as financing from other MDBs and the private sector.
The nature of the funding for countries depends on whether a country
is shaping a project around one of the IDB’s strategic goals or whether it is
seeking funds to close a funding gap for a project that is on that country’s
development agenda. Funding from the IDB falls into two categories:
non-reimbursable grants and reimbursable loans. Non-reimbursable grants
facilitate certain predetermined outcomes identified by the IDB as priority
areas for assistance. Countries apply for funding within these select
categories to receive technical cooperation in the form of grant funding to
achieve targeted outcomes. IDB subject-matter experts work with
countries to help them match their specific funding needs to these grant
82. Carrasco et al., supra note 78.
83. Who We Are, IDB, https://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/
ZA7F-B8C8] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
84. About Us, IDB, https://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/overview [https://perma.cc/KY4S
-XWYJ].
85. Public Sector Financing, IBD, https://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/idb-financing/publ
ic-sector-financing [https://perma.cc/5LD9-SZ8B] (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
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categories.
IDB reimbursable loans, on the other hand, are constructed on the
basis of country-need and do not fall within any predetermined category.
Countries apply for funds for specific projects for which they have already
sought other external funding to support. These loans are offered at below-
market interest rates and serve as supplemental development assistance to
funding from other MDBs and similar organizations.
Each of the funding mechanisms—non-reimbursable grants and
reimbursable loans—include a prohibited practice clause that requires the
loan recipient and all parties associated with the agreement to maintain
compliance with IDB anti-corruption guidelines. Failure to do so may lead
to withdrawal of funding and possible debarment of parties who violate the
stipulated rules, including one or more of the contractors that operate under
that loan, whether they are aware of that relationship or not.
In the next section, I will describe in more detail the anti-corruption
efforts established by the World Bank and those adopted by the IDB for
loan agreements.
b. Anti-Corruption Efforts in Loan Agreements
The World Bank began integrating anti-corruption provisions into its
loan agreements in the 1990s.86 In that initial effort, the Bank defined
corruption as:
Fraudulent and corrupt practices include the solicitation, payment
or receipt of bribes, gratuities or kickbacks, or the manipulation
of loans or Bank Group-financed contracts through any form of
misrepresentation. Fraudulent or corrupt practices also include
any situation in which staff members have abused their position
or misused World Bank Group funds or other public funds for
private gain.87
The guidance provided by the Bank focused on five pillars to combat
corruption in member countries: 1) preventing fraud and corruption within
World Bank projects; 2) helping countries that request Bank support in
their efforts to reduce corruption; 3) taking corruption more explicitly into
account in country assistance strategies, country lending considerations,
policy dialogues, analytical work, and the choice and design of projects; 4)
adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption; and
86. MARIO A. AGUILAR ET AL., PREVENTING FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN WORLD BANK
PROJECTS: A GUIDE FOR STAFF 2 (2000), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrup
t/fraudguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUD5-N3UA].
87. Id. at 1.
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5) protecting the Bank from internal fraud and corruption.88
In the World Bank Procurement Guidelines, the term corrupt practice
is defined as the “offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting . . . of anything
of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement
process or in contract execution.”89 The Guidelines go on to describe the
three possible remedies the Bank will employ if it discovers that corrupt
practices were utilized during the procurement or execution process for the
loan. They may: 1) reject a proposal if a bidder engaged in corrupt
procurement practices; 2) cancel the portion of the loan allocated to a
contract in which corrupt practices were engaged in by the bidder or their
representatives or any loan beneficiary; and 3) debar a firm if it engaged in
corrupt practices during the procurement or execution of the loan.90
The IDB has sanction rules similar to those of the World Bank. The
rules are found in the Prohibited Practices document of the IDB.91 That
document states that all parties subject to the IDB rules, including direct
and indirect parties—government entities and private contractors,92 are
prohibited from engaging in corrupt, fraudulent, coercive, collusive, or
obstructive practices in the procurement or execution of the loan.93 Though
all of these practices relate to anti-corruption efforts, I will limit my
analysis to “corrupt practices,” which the IDB defines as: “offering,
giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value to
influence improperly the actions of another party.”94
88. Id. at 2.
89. WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDITS
art. 1.14(a)(i) (2004), documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/886341468128096812/pdf/9547
20PUB0Box3000ProcGuid0050040ev1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLX9-TGU6].
90. Id. at art. 1.14(b) – (d).
91. Sanctions Procedures, IDB, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?do
cnum=39676437 [https://perma.cc/83B6-D3V5] (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
92. See id. at § 1.2 (stating “(i) in the case of a Project that is not a non-sovereign
guaranteed (NSG) Project or a Project financed by the Corporation, any party involved in
such a Project whether by virtue of a contract with a member of the Bank Group or with
other parties in connection with a Project, including, inter alia, borrowers, recipient of
grants, beneficiaries of a technical cooperation, bidders, suppliers, contractors,
subcontractors, consultants, subconsultants, service providers, applicants, concessionaries
and financial intermediaries (including their respective officers, employees and agents); (ii)
in a non-sovereign guaranteed (NSG) Project or a Project financed by the Corporation, any
party involved provided that such parties are direct contract counterparties of the Bank or
the Corporation, including counterparties that are borrowers, sponsors, guaranteed parties,
direct beneficiaries of guarantees, and investee companies (including their respective
officers, employees and agents), as applicable; (iii) parties who contract with the Bank or
Corporation for advisory services to be performed by the Bank or Corporation; and (iv)
contract counterparties of the Bank or Corporation in relation to corporate procurement by
the Bank or Corporation or any other matter not covered by clauses (i), (ii) or (iii), above.”).
93. Id. at § 2.2.
94. Id. at § 2.2(a).
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The investigation process utilized by the IDB to identify corrupt
practices begins with the Office of Institutional Integrity (OIC). Once an
allegation of corruption (or other prohibited practice) has been made, the
OIC opens an investigation to gather evidence to substantiate the claim.95
If the OIC concludes that a preponderance of the evidence supports the
claim that a party engaged in a corrupt practice, the Chief of the OIC refers
the matter to a Sanctions Officer appointed by the President of the Bank by
issuing a Statement of Charges.96
Upon review of the Statement of Charges, the Sanctions Officer will
have three options for how to proceed: 1) dismiss the allegations for
insufficient evidence of passage of the statute of limitations;97 2) issue a
Notice of Administrative Action; or 3) refer the matter to another IDB
group for review.98 If the Sanctions Officer concludes that the evidence is
sufficient and issues a Notice of Administrative Action, the country has
sixty days to file a response.99 Failure to respond is equivalent to an
admission.100 Following the sixty-day period, the Sanctions Officer issues
a Final Determination that is presented to the IDB Sanctions Committee for
review.
The IDB Sanctions Committee will allow forty-five days for the
respondent party to appeal the Sanctions Officer’s Final Determination,
unless they choose to waive that appeal.101 Following that period and the
Committee’s review of the evidence, the Committee shall then determine
whether enough evidence exists to issue a sanction, which has immediate
effect.102 The Committee is not bound to apply the sanctions recommended
by the Sanctions Officer. Rather, they have the following options open to
them:
1. Reprimand: sending a formal letter to respondent but
providing no further punishment.103
2. Debarment: temporarily or permanently debarring the entity
for direct or indirect participation in any future IDB projects.104
3. Conditional non-debarment: mandating certain remedial
measures to be employed to avoid being debarred from future
95. Id. at §§ 3.2, 3.3.
96. Id.
97. Applies to allegations of fraud that took place more than 10 years prior to the
submission of the statement of charges. Id. at § 4.2.2.
98. Id. at §§ 4.2, 4.5, 14. 5.
99. Id. at § 4.7.
100. Id. at § 4.8.
101. Id. at § 6.1.
102. Id. at §§ 7.2, 7.3.
103. Id. at § 8.2.1.
104. Id. at § 8.2.2.
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IDB projects.105
4. Conditional debarment: debarring the entity from future IDB
projects unless and until certain remedial measures are
implemented.106
5. Other sanctions: including fines to reimburse the cost of the
investigation or restitution of funds.107
If the entity is debarred, it may be debarred from other multilateral lending
institutions through a procedure known as cross-debarment (discussed
below).108
The prohibited practice clause is referenced in its entirety in all IDB
loan and grant agreements and is referenced throughout those agreements
as a basis for cancellation or exception from loan disbursement.109 This
includes clear application to the government entity signing the agreement
as well as all parties bidding for work under the agreement. However, in
effect, the punishment burden falls upon the contractors more than it does
upon the government recipient of the loan.
Finally, I will describe the sanctions process for World Bank and IDB
loans.
c. Debarment
The punishment adopted as part of the World Bank’s anti-corruption
program is the temporary removal of a company from an authorized list of
vendors to work on Bank projects. This punishment, known as debarment,
is similar to that utilized by the U.S. government in its procurement
procedures.110 Debarment means that a sanctioned firm or individual will
be prohibited from working on Bank-funded projects for the duration of a
given period of time or, in some extreme cases, forever. The World Bank’s
debarment program was initiated in 1996 and is supported by a sanctions
committee that was established two years later.111
Debarment is the principal remedy employed by MDBs to incentivize
105. Id. at § 8.2.3.
106. Id. at § 8.2.4.
107. Id. at § 8.2.5.
108. Id. at § 8.2.6.
109. See IDB Loan Contract No. 3340/OC-BH between the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas and the Inter-American Development Bank, IDB (Feb. 4, 2016), http://idbdocs.iad
b.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=40819780 [https://perma.cc/74DQ-LS76]
(referencing “prohibited practices” 12 times throughout the contract).
110. Suspension and Debarment Program, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/grants/suspension
-and-debarment-program [https://perma.cc/Z7ZS-57JT] (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
111. World Bank Group Sanctions Regime: An Overview, WORLD BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/other-documents/osd/Overvie
w-SecM2010-0543.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YHQ-WQF4] (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
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compliance with loan requirements, including the anti-corruption
provisions therein. In the case of World Bank financing, debarment is the
first out of five possible sanctions levied by the Suspension and Debarment
Officer (SDO), which include:
1. Debarment
2. Debarment with conditional release
3. Conditional debarment
4. Restitution
5. Reprimand letter112
Yet like the IDB, the World Bank relies most heavily on the use of
debarment with conditional release as its primary remedy for anti-
corruption cases.113 The goal is not to limit the field of potential
contractors, which can be thin, but rather to improve the transparency and
good governance of those entities to prepare them for future economic
development work. For this reason, the Bank frequently enters into
Negotiated Resolution Agreements that provide clear terms for a firm or
individual to come into compliance and regain access to Bank funding.114
Debarment from one institution might deter a domestic firm that relies
on projects from that government; however, a multinational firm would be
able to offset a single-entity debarment by leveraging projects in another
region in which they are not debarred. To prevent this debarment sidestep,
the World Bank has entered into an agreement with other multilateral
institutions to establish a system of cross-debarment, which enables the
entities to expand the reach of debarment penalties by preventing culpable
parties from securing work from any of the included entities.115 This
procedure was initiated by the World Bank in 2010 and includes the
African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-
American Development Bank Group.
Cross-debarment is a practice that has long been in place for U.S.
federal government contractors. If a contractor is barred by one federal
agency, they are automatically barred from contracting with any other
federal agency.116 With cross-debarment between partners of the World
112. Pascale H. Dubois et al., The World Bank’s Sanctions System: Using Debarment to
Combat Fraud and Corruption in International Development, AIIB YEARBOOK INT’L L.,
2018, at 129, 139–40.
113. Id. at 140.
114. Id.
115. WORLD BANK GRP., SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT FY18 7 (2018),
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/227911538495181415/WBG-SanctionsSystemARFY18-
final-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/38HH-FVSN].
116. FAR 9.401 (2011).
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Bank, however, cross-debarment is only automatic if certain criteria are
met.117 And while a good case could be made to support automatic
debarment here as well, the discretionary power enables the other
institutions to leverage the threat of debarment to incentivize more
immediate change.118
I will now turn to an analysis of the effects of the prohibited practice
clause and suspension and debarment process upon corruption within Latin
America.
III. IS ITWORKING? EXAMPLES OF ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIONS BY
THE IDB
Fighting corruption requires a concerted effort by governmental
institutions and a commitment to change past practices. But it also requires
a change in the culture of governance and business. Scholars Ben
Heineman and Fritz Heimann119 suggest the following four factors to
reduce corruption: “prevention via legislation and regulations, prevention
via long-term state building and institutional reform, and prevention via
norm and value changes,” and enforcement “to deter future misconduct by
investigating and prosecuting existing corruption.”120
IDB President Luis Alberto Moreno convened an Advisory Group of
governance and anti-corruption scholars to identify innovative ways to
combat rampant corruption in Latin America. Their 2018 report began
with a dire warning:
It is impossible to overstate the urgency of this effort.
117. Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, ASIAN DEV. BANK
(Apr. 9, 2010), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32774/files/cr
oss-debarment-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD89-VY8B] [hereinafter AMEDD]; see
also Edouard Fromageau, Cross Debarment, MAX PLANCK INST. (Mar. 2016),
http://www.mpi.lu/fileadmin/mpi/medien/research/MPEiPro/EiPro_Sample_Cross_
Debarment_2017-Mar.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF9X-2NSX] (stating “1) the debarment must
be sanctioning fraud, corruption, collusion or coercion; 2) it must be public; 3) it must be for
at least one year; 4) it must have been made after the entry into force of AMEDD; 5) it must
have been made within ten years of the date of commission of the misconduct; 6) it must not
be based on a decision of national or other international authority”).
118. See Christopher R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 219, 232 (2013) (discussing the desirability and drawbacks of stricter
debarment and cross debarment rules).
119. Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85
FOREIGN AFF. 75, 77 (2006).
120. Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on
World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 231, 240
(2011) (quoting Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption,
85 FOREIGN AFF. 75, 77 (2006)).
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Corruption is rampant at the highest levels of government,
society, and the economy. It is linked to the pernicious presence
of state capture by the elites in much of the region and, as
illustrated in the Lava Jato case, operates across borders. The
evidence suggests that on balance, over the past two decades,
there have been no significant improvements in the region in key
governance dimensions, or worse—in fact, with some
exceptions, the region has performing poorly in the
implementation of the rule of law and in control of corruption.
The distortive impact of money in politics in the region is
associated with policies and practices benefiting the elite few
and, with failed reforms, undermining public trust in government
and in democratic institutions.121
The expert panel went on to describe how most Latin American
countries are so deeply corrupt that resources are not able to achieve their
public purpose, and how the rule of law and good policy are undermined.122
They also highlighted the worsening environment of transparency in light
of the preoccupation of countries such as the United States and United
Kingdom, which had previously been critical in shining light on policies
and practices in extractive industries in Latin America but are at present
focused on other priorities.123 Finally, the report identified a connection
between high levels of corruption and inequality, which is equally rampant
in the region, explaining that corruption and poor governance divert
resources toward the wealthy and away from projects that would help the
poor.124
The IDB has only a handful of cases in its history that resulted in
debarment. The most recent (as of January 2019) is the case of GL
Systems, an American software firm that was providing services in
Barbados. The firm was debarred for four years in connection with its
work with the Barbados customs service, the Barbados Competitiveness
Program, and an IDB corporate contract.125 This was the IDB’s first
121. EDUARDO ENGEL ET AL., REPORT OF THE EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP ON ANTI-
CORRUPTION, TRANSPARENCY, AND INTEGRITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN v
(2018), https://publications.iadb.org/sites/default/files/publications/english/document/Report
-of-the-Expert-Advisory-Group-on-Anti-Corruption-Transparency-and-Integrity-in-Latin-
America-and-the-Caribbean.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TMP-QW8A] [hereinafter IDB
ADVISORY REPORT].
122. Id. (“In most LAC countries, corruption and capture are systemic. Networks of
interconnected political and economic elites often undermine sound policymaking and the
rule of law, entrenching impunity, and diverting public resources and investment away from
the public good.”).
123. Id. at 1.
124. Id. at 4.
125. IDB Announces Settlement in Connection with Prohibited Practices, IDB (Aug. 21,
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debarment resulting from a settlement agreement, which included
stipulations requiring the firm to hire an independent third-party consultant
to analyze its compliance program.126 That debarment is also subject to
cross-debarment sanctions across other MDBs.
The GL Systems case is similar to other cases of debarment by the
IDB, with very few details made publicly available.127 In other cases,
details about the debarred firm’s activities are only revealed by third
parties, such as the case of two Trinidadian firms in Guyana that worked on
an IDB citizen security project and were debarred for, according to local
news sources, delivering expired or nearly expired medicines to the
Ministry of Health, among other things.128 On the contrary, the World
Bank typically issues a press release announcing its own debarments and
providing some insight into the circumstances of those investigations.129
However, this does not exempt the Latin American region from
corruption investigations and suspensions. Because many loan recipients
receive funding from both the IDB and the World Bank, corruption
investigations may be initiated by the World Bank and, through cross-
debarment provisions, the firms are prohibited from receiving IDB funding
as well.130 For instance, in the case of three Argentinian firms alleged to
have misrepresented progress under an agricultural development project in
2018), https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-announces-settlement-connection-prohibited-pract
ices [https://perma.cc/QCR5-627S].
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Ava Turnquest, IDB Bans Companies for Fraud and Corruption, TRIBUNE
242, July 7, 2017, http://www.tribune242.com/news/2017/jul/07/idb-bans-companies-fraud-
and-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/543K-K7UU] (describing the debarment of 10 Bahamian
firms for fraud and corruption but not explaining the acts).
128. Carol Corbin, Ministry Single-Sourced Contract to Western Scientific Even Though
Probe Urged Blacklisting, GUY. NEWS & INFO., Sept. 4, 2017,
https://guyana.hoop.la/topic/ministry-single-sourced-contract-to-western-scientific-even-tho
ugh-probe-urged-blacklisting-ppc-to-investigate [https://perma.cc/TS7N-BH44];
Trinidadian Companies Blacklisted by IDB for Fraud in Guyana, LOOP NEWS, Jan. 4, 2017,
http://www.looptt.com/content/trinidadian-companies-blacklisted-idb-fraud-guyana
[https://perma.cc/3FPF-A5YP].
129. See, e.g., Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Group Announces Debarment of
Three Companies in Argentina (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-rel
ease/2018/02/01/world-bank-group-announces-debarment-of-three-companies-in-argentina
[https://perma.cc/UMA8-F2SK] (discussing the conditions leading to the debarment of firms
in Argentina); Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Group Announces Debarment of
Companies in Connection with Misconduct in Projects in Bangladesh, India and Timor-
Leste (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/03/28/world-
bank-group-announces-debarment-of-companies-in-connection-with-misconduct-in-
projects-in-bangladesh-india-and-timor-leste [https://perma.cc/54SG-UJHA] (describing the
conditions for debarring firms in three countries).
130. See AMEDD, supra note 117 (describing the conditions in which debarment
decisions are mutually enforced by multiple institutions).
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that country in 2018, the World Bank debarred those firms for 18
months.131 The IDB cross-debarred those same firms for the same period of
time.132
One positive effect resulting from the more visible and broad-based
anti-corruption program instituted by these MDBs is an increased
awareness of the need for internal compliance programs by contractors
looking to work with foreign governments in developing countries. In the
past, engaging in corrupt acts outside the auspices of the FCPA or UK
Anti-bribery Act meant minimal risk of prosecution or penalties. Today, a
contractor found complicit in these MDB prohibited practices may face
debarment across all countries in which it had previously done business,
making for a much riskier environment for firms—especially multinational
firms—working in this space.133
AWAY FORWARD: CONCLUDING REMARKS
According to the 2018 report of the World Bank Sanctions
Committee, eighty-three firms were debarred or otherwise sanctioned by
the World Bank that fiscal year.134 Of the 1,426 complaints filed with that
office, 927 were dismissed as requiring no further action, and 68 new
investigations were opened.135 Of those investigations that began in 2018,
10 were in the Latin American region.136 Between 2007 and 2014, the
Bank sanctioned 250 firms.137 Most of the firms debarred by the World
Bank in Latin America resulted in cross-debarment by the IDB.
One significant critique of the sanctions regime in place by both the
World Bank and other multilateral lending institutions is that the target of
131. Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Group Announces Debarment of Three
Companies in Argentina (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2
018/02/01/world-bank-group-announces-debarment-of-three-companies-in-argentina
[https://perma.cc/UMA8-F2SK].
132. Sanctioned Firms and Individuals, IDB, https://www.iadb.org/en/topics/transpare
ncy/integrity-at-the-idb-group/sanctioned-firms-and-individuals%2C1293.html [https://perm
a.cc/BM9N-37N4].
133. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: AN
EMERGING GIANT AMONG TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORS (2012) (advising firms working on
development projects to consider implementing a compliance program).
134. WORLD BANK GRP., SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT FY18 8 (2018), http://pub
docs.worldbank.org/en/227911538495181415/WBG-SanctionsSystemARFY18-final-for-
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/38HH-FVSN].
135. Id.
136. Id. at 17.
137. THEWORLD BANK OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT, REPORT ON FUNCTIONS,
DATA AND LESSONS LEARNED 2007-2013, 24 (2014), documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/3
53781468320949616/pdf/940700WP0Box385412B00PUBLIC00OSDReport.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/CE99-R24W].
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sanctions is generally the private sector, which is working to contract with
government entities to secure project financing through these loans;
however, the government entity itself—though its direct involvement may
aggravate penalties—is largely relieved of liability.138 Anti-corruption
efforts that address only the effects of a corrupt governance environment
cannot possibly achieve the change that institutions such as the World Bank
and the IDB are striving for.
In 2004, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs
John B. Taylor testified before the U.S. Congress about recent reforms
within the multilateral lending institutions meant to combat corruption
within the institutions and their target firms.139 He explained the
importance of those institutions in facilitating economic growth through
governance reforms, as well as the alignment of MDB policies with U.S.
interests abroad. He emphasized reforms in the procurement process that
would yield more transparency and accountability for development
projects, noting that “the United States has advocated greater availability of
information on MDB projects, policies, Board meetings, fraud and
corruption cases, and results indicators.”140
One significant critique of the current sanctions process is the
administrative procedure itself. Rather than operating as an administrative
procedure like in international trade or domestic taxation, investigations
and sanctions for corruption follow a procedure more akin to criminal
procedure.141 This can leave the institution in a defensive position whereby
it expends significant resources on ensuring due process and fairness to the
parties and less emphasis on the investigation and prosecution of bad
practices. This is evidenced through the two-tier system in place both at
the World Bank and the IDB, with significant discretion built into the
system to allow for reevaluation, mitigation, and appeal, as discussed
above.
138. See, e.g., Tina Søreide, Linda Gröning & Rasmus Wandall, An Efficient
Anticorruption Sanctions Regime? The Case of the World Bank, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 523,
529–31 (2016) (describing how private firms can be held accountable for corrupt practices
more easily than governments).
139. Combating Multilateral Development Bank Corruption: U.S. Treasury Role and
Internal Efforts [Part II], Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong.
4–16 (2004) (statement of John B. Taylor, Under Secretary for International Affairs,
Department of the Treasury).
140. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of the
Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Testimony Before the House Appropriations Subcomm. on
Foreign Operations, Exp. Fin. & Related Programs, FY2005 Budget Request for Treasury
Int’l Programs (May 20, 2004), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
js1669.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7G8-9PX3].
141. Tina Søreide, Linda Gröning & Rasmus Wandall, An Efficient Anticorruption
Sanctions Regime? The Case of the World Bank, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 523, 535–37 (2016).
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According to the IDB Expert Advisory Panel Report referenced
earlier, effective reductions in governance and corruption can lead to a
three-fold increase of GDP per capita in the long run.142 The IDB Advisory
Report also suggests that corruption be addressed in a multi-faceted way,
targeting both petty corruption and grand corruption. “Reforms ought to
span both the supply and demand sides of corruption and engage the
private and public sectors. Any meaningful plan must incorporate both
‘grand’ corruption (including elite capture by powerful vested interests and
corruption in politics) and the day-to-day payoffs solicited from ordinary
people and small businesses.”143 The authors identified four pillars to focus
on in this anti-corruption effort:
(1) regional and global initiatives;
(2) domestic initiatives;
(3) engaging the private sector and civil society; and
(4) the support of the IDB and other international organizations144
The focus of my analysis is on the fourth pillar. In that area, the
report highlights a number of efforts that the IDB could be engaging in to
better root-out and reduce corrupt practices and improve governance in
Latin America. Among these, the IDB could partner with other entities
such as the OECD or the IMF, which also play an important role in
supporting economic development in the region;145 develop benchmarks
and best practices in public procurement that could be adopted throughout
the region;146 encourage transparency reforms among state-owned
enterprises;147 ensure that private sector investments through IDB Invest
include the same transparency standards found in public procurements;148
and share relevant information about past investigations to develop best
practices for both governing bodies and contracting parties.149
One of the key recommendations made in the report with respect to
loan agreements relates to sanction mechanisms. Currently, as discussed
above, the IDB will investigate allegations of corruption in the procurement
and implementation process for any loan agreement and will potentially
debar a contractor who was found to violate IDB rules. However, the
Advisory Report authors suggest that these investigative and disciplinary
procedures be done in collaboration with the countries in which the
142. IDBADVISORY REPORT, supra note 121, at 3.
143. Id. at 9.
144. Id. at 11.
145. Id. at 24–25.
146. Id. at 25.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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behavior is occurring, allowing those governments to take ownership of the
situation and build its good governance capacity.150 More specifically, this
recommendation might allow the country to debar the contractor not only
from IDB projects, but potentially from all government projects, yielding a
much larger disciplinary effect and a stronger incentive to implement
internal compliance programs to avoid a potentially debilitating sanction.151
Another recommendation for improving the anti-corruption efforts of
the IDB and other multilateral institutions is to enhance the cross-
debarment practice beyond the current partnership of institutions. As
practitioners in this field are well-aware, firms that compete for contracts
with multilateral institutions are also competing for contracts with other
domestic and foreign government entities, among others. And as recent
cases have highlighted, the fact that a firm is blacklisted by the World Bank
and even cross-debarred by its partner institutions does not prevent it from
securing contracts from other entities.152 One possible enhancement to this
system is to improve information-sharing among multilateral lending
institutions and other governmental entities in the United States and
abroad.153
Related to debarment is the disproportionate impact of debarment on
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) versus larger entities. The
typical World Bank sanction is debarment with conditional release,
allowing a party to relieve itself of the punishment by making procedural or
practical changes in its operation.154 This sanction may be harder to avoid
for an SME that is less familiar with the process of appealing a decision or
taking steps to come into compliance with the terms of the loan
agreement.155 To avoid the application of a sanctions regime that
150. Id. at 26; see also Brian Whisler et al., The World Bank’s Enforcement Arm and Its
Impact on Multinational Companies, RISK & COMPLIANCE MAG., Jan.–Mar. 2018, at 7
(explaining the World Bank’s transparent process for sharing investigation information with
governments as well as, in some cases, companies).
151. IDBADVISORY REPORT, supra note 121, at 25.
152. See, e.g., Katia Savchuk et al., Contractor Blacklisted by World Bank Still Gets
Millions in Work, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/c
ontractor-blaclisted-by-world-bank-still-gets-millions-in-work/2016/09/23/8bbc0f14-7ea1-
11e6-9070-5c4905bf40dc_story.html?utm_term=.814dd42edaf7 [https://perma.cc/VKZ9-W
AGW] (discussing the case of Chicago-based consulting firm Glocoms, which was debarred
by the World Bank but continued to win U.S. government contracts).
153. See Christopher R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 219, 232 (2013) (suggesting more information-sharing to avoid
subversion of the purpose of cross-debarment).
154. WORLD BANK GRP., THE WORLD BANK GROUP’S SANCTIONS REGIME: INFORMATION
NOTE 6, https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/other-documents/osd
/TheWorldBankGroupSanctionsRegime.pdf [https://perma.cc/66SX-436D].
155. Rohan Schaap & Cecile Divino, The AMEDD Five Years On: Trends in
Enforcement Actions and Challenges Facing the Enforcement Landscape, 57 HARV. INT’L
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disincentivizes small firms from seeking MDB-funded development grants,
governments must do a better job in advising potential SME partners about
the need for effective compliance practices through trainings and
information sessions.156
International bodies with social and political appeal, such as the
United Nations or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, mean well and provide unmatched quality for policy and
governance best practices; however, where they often fall short is in their
ability to see their policies enforced. Membership in those social and
political organizations certainly offers useful incentives, such as
recognition and respect,157 but without the ability to penalize bad acts
economically, membership alone does little to create the environment
necessary to stem the tide of corruption. This is an area in which MDBs
have the potential to have a significant amount of influence over donor
recipient country governance and corruption policies, especially given that
they are often the last lifeline that many of these countries can utilize for
their survival.158 And as we know from FCPA prosecutions, economic
sanctions can be a significantly more motivating factor affecting
compliance than political recognition.
The MDBs—and especially the IDB in Latin America—are well-
positioned to champion the cause of changing the culture of corruption.
For the past 18 years, those institutions have taken up the mantle of
identifying corrupt practices as harmful for economic growth and
development, and they have consistently enhanced their efforts to combat it
worldwide. Today, the World Bank is going to great lengths to “sell” anti-
corruption to countries as a means to promote private investment and
advance their own interests.159 World Bank Integrity Chief Pascale Dubois
L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2016) (“The fact that some entities have little opportunity to succeed in
meeting the conditions for release means that the sanction is essentially a default indefinite
debarment which may then result in a default indefinite cross-debarment.”).
156. See, e.g., OECD, RIGHT FROM THE START: INFLUENCING THE COMPLIANCE
ENVIRONMENT FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (2012), https://www.oecd.org/tax/adm
inistration/right-from-the-start-influencing-the-compliance-environment-for-smes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NV6-9EDM] (discussing a governmental approach to encourage tax
compliance at the inception of the business formation as a mechanism to foster long-term
compliance).
157. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The
1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward
Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485 (2000) (arguing that the OECD
was the motivator for many of the anti-corruption efforts of other multilateral institutions).
158. See HANNAH HARRIS, THE GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION REGIME: THE CASE OF PAPUA
NEW GUINEA (2018) (explaining the value and importance of MDBs in promoting good
governance).
159. Michael Igoe, Can the World Bank ‘Sell’ Anti-Corruption?, DEVEX (May 3, 2018),
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recently stated, “[a] country that starts getting a better reputation in terms
of fighting corruption will attract much more private sector investment than
other countries.”160
The key to an effective anti-corruption regime starts with the
requirement that all financing of economic development projects mandate
compliance with the prohibited practices clause, and that all investigations
and debarments are mutually recognized, publicized and enforced across
multilateral lending institutions. But these efforts will only succeed if loan
recipients—governments—realize that their development is in their own
hands and that without internal changes to institutions, policies, and
culture, development aid will remain a lifeline rather than a stepping stone.
https://www.devex.com/news/can-the-world-bank-sell-anti-corruption-92678 [https://perma.
cc/TLW6-LRMM].
160. Id.
